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Children are probably the most vulnerable group in our society when it comes
to voicing their opinions and taking a stand for their beliefs. Because of their younger
age, they are not given much credit for their opinions. Part of the reason for this is
that their status as minors' places them under the legal care and custody of their
parents This creates the inference that the parents best represent what the child is
or should be feeling. In addition, minors have limited legal rights, such as the right
to vote, drink, and drive.3 These factors may lead to the view that minors are some-
how not as deserving of the full protection of our laws as adults are. This has an
adverse effect on children as a whole, one consequence of which is the increase in
crimes committed by minors in general.4 Therefore, it is up to parents, teachers,
judges, and legislators, among others, to ensure that minors are adequately repre-
sented by our laws, and are provided the fullest protection by them as well.' There
are three important areas where minors' interests tend to be overlooked. The first is
in child custody proceedings, where the children usually do not have much input into
the determination of their own future? The second area involves dating violence
among teens8 and the lack of legal protection provided to them? Finally, the third
1. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 3901 (k)(1) (West 1991) (defining "minor" as an individual who has not attained
the age of 18 years).
2. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that a parent and/or guardian having custody
of a minor is responsible for any willful misconduct of the minor which results in injury to person or property, or
death).
3. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25658(b) (West Supp. 1997) (making the purchase of alcoholic
beverages or consumption of such in any on-sale premises by a person under 21 years old a misdemeanor); CAL.
ELEc. CODE § 2000(b) (West 1996) (stating that any person at least 18 years old at the time of the next election is
eligible to vote at that election); CAL. VEH. CODE § 12507 (West Supp. 1997) (providing that anyone over sixteen
years of age may apply for a driver's license).
4. See Kevin M. Burke, Preventing Youth Violence: District Attorney's Callfor a Community Response.
21 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Ctv. COwNFEENT 433, 433 (1995) (setting forth statistics on the increase in the
number of juvenile crimes and the adverse effect it has on children).
5. See id. (discussing the need for the development of a comprehensive social response to crime prevention,
which includes parents and student leaders).
6. See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.
8. For purposes of this Legislative Note, "teens" or "teenager" is defined as an individual between the ages
of 13 and 17, and an 18-year-old is considered to be an adult.
9. See infra Part M1.
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area is the tragic reality of child abuse in which minors are not provided with the
fullest protection of our laws.'
In 1996, three bills were introduced in California that amended existing laws to
provide minors with more legal protection and rights in these areas." This Legis-
lative Note focuses on these amendments and their positive affect on minors.
II. CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
California law, before the passage of the amendments, allowed a juvenile court 
1 2
to issue restraining orders during the pendency of any proceeding to declare a minor
child a dependent of that court, against any parent, guardian, or member of the
child's household.1 3 In addition, it provided that the juvenile court could issue pro-
tective orders against either parent once a child had been declared a dependent of the
juvenile court. 4 Existing California laws also provided that once a child had been
declared a dependent of the juvenile court, no other division of the superior court
could issue orders regarding that minor while the juvenile court had jurisdiction.'5
Existing laws in California also provided that a juvenile court, at the time it ter-
minated its jurisdiction over the minor, could issue protective orders directed at either
parent and issue custody and visitation orders.16
Chapter 1138 clarifies these proceedings by specifying when ajuvenile court has
the authority to issue restraining orders and against whom these orders may be
issued.' 7 First, Chapter 1138 extends the time in which a juvenile court may issue
protective orders from the moment a petition to declare a child under the jurisdiction
of the court has been filed, until the time the juvenile court terminates its juris-
diction.' 3 Second, Chapter 1138 allows the juvenile court to issue restraining orders
10. See infra Part IV.
11. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1138, at 6311-18 (amending CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 213.5,304,362.4,
366.25,366.3, 11404.1); 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 835, at 3625 (amending CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011); 1996 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 727, at 3249 (amending CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 and CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301).
12. See CaL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 245 (West 1984) (defining "juvenile court" as the name given to a
superior court sitting in the exercise ofjurisdiction over juvenile court proceedings).
13. Id. § 213.5(a) (amended by Chapter 1138).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 304 (amended by Chapter 1138); see id. (adding that the juvenile court can issue protective orders
against the parents also once the child has been declared a dependent of the court).
16. Id. § 362.4 (amended by Chapter 1138).
17. SENATECOMMrTfEEONJUDIClARY, CO , mTEE ANALYSIS of AB 2154, at 1-2 (June 18, 1996); see id.
(explaining that the intent of this bill is to clarify the time when ajuvenile court may issue restraining orders, and
to make the three provisions of juvenile dependency law consistent as to against whom these orders may be issued).
For additional analysis of bills impacting this area, see Julie Momjian, Review of Selected 1996 California
Legislation, 28 PAC. LJ. 631, 854 n.52 (1997).
18. CAL WEM. & INST. CODE § 213.5(a) (amended by Chapter 1138); see id. (providing that after a petition
has been filed and until the time that the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated, the juvenile court may
issue ex parte orders); id. § 304 (amended by Chapter 1138) (providing that after a petition has been filed and until
the time that it is dismissed or dependency is terminated, all issues regarding custody of the child shall be heard
by the juvenile court); id. § 362.4 (amended by Chapter 1138) (providing that when ajuvenile court terminate- its
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against current or former members of the child's household as well as any parent or
guardian. 19 Finally, Chapter 1138 reduces the time period between status reviews for
children under certain circumstances from eighteen months to twelve months?
Chapter 1138 was designed to grant juvenile courts more power to hear certain
proceedings and issue protective orders against a wider range of people that might
be affecting the child at issue.2' To provide this greater authority would create more
consistency and less confusion in the law.22 Moreover, it is good policy to allow the
juvenile court to have more power over minors and their issues than other divisions
of superior court since the juvenile court is geared specifically to deal with such
cases. 23 This is exemplified in the case of In re Roger S.24 In this case, after the
juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over a minor, the court refused to consider
the father's evidence on visitation and instead ordered the previously existing
visitation arrangement to be filed in superior court.25 The Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that when making an order to be transferred to family court, a juvenile court
has the power to hear evidence relevant to that order?6 The court reasoned that
because the juvenile court has been empowered by the legislature to issue custody
and restraining orders, that fact expresses the belief that "the juvenile court is the
appropriate place for these matters to be determined and that the juvenile court's
orders must be honored in later superior court proceedings." 27 This demonstrates that
courts are willing to give greater authority to juvenile courts to determine their own
issues.
jurisdiction over a child concerning whom an order has been entered with regard to custody of that child, the
juvenile court may issue a protective order).
19. Id. § 213.5(a) (amended by Chapter 1138); see id. (stating that the juvenile court may issue restraining
orders against a parent, guardian, or current or former member of the child's household); id. § 304 (amended by
Chapter 1138) (stating that the juvenile court may issue an order directed to any parent, guardian, or current or
former member of the child's household); id. § 362.4 (amended by Chapter 1138) (stating that the juvenile court
may issue a protective order directed to any parent, guardian, or current or former member of the child's
household).
20. Id. § 366.25(a) (amended by Chapter 1138); see id. (stating that in the case of minors who are placed
in foster care because they cannot be returned home, a hearing shall be held every twelve months to determine the
minor's future status); id. § 366.3(0 (amended by Chapter 1138) (stating that for minors who are dependents of the
juvenile court, a hearing shall be held every 12 months to find permanent homes for them); id. § 11404.1 (amended
by Chapter 1138) (stating that to be eligible for AFDC-FC, a child shall receive a permanency planning hearing
every 12 months).
21. See SENATFCOMMrrEEONJUDIcIARY, COMMrrrEEANALYsISOFAB 2154, at 3 (June 18,1996) (stating
that the authority of the juvenile court to issue restraining orders is expanded to include "any current or former
member" of the child's household).
22. See id. at 4 (stating that Chapter 1138 is needed to clarify discrepancies relating to the court's authority
to issue restraining orders).
23. See ASSEMBLY CoMmri'm ON JuDICIARY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2154, at 2 (May 8, 1996)
(setting forth arguments in support of Chapter 1138, namely, that it clarifies the law with respect to exactly when
the juvenile court has the authority to issue restraining orders).
24. 4 Cal. App. 4th 25,5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992).
25. In re Roger S., at 28, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
26. Id. at 30,5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210.
27. Id. at 31, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
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Another area affected by Chapter 1138 is the group of persons against whom
protective orders can be issued. Encompassing "current or former members" of the
child's household expands the group of persons affected by the order because it takes
into consideration persons other than the biological parents.29 This seems appropriate
in light of the fact that the definition of modem day households has changed from the
times of the traditional two-parent family comprising the household.3° The traditional
definition of "family," which we are all accustomed to, is seen in the case of Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas.3' Today, the definition has expanded to include children
who are not related by blood to both parents.32 For example, many gay couples are
having or adopting children.33 There are also many more cohabitating couples having
children without ever getting married, as well as other alternative lifestyles com-
prising modem day "families. ' 34 Consequently, the chances that a member of a
child's family belongs to one of these "families" has increased accordingly. Thus, to
exclude from the meaning of "family" one of these persons would be to ignore a seg-
ment of the population that should be subject to these statutes as well as "traditional"
family members.
There is evidence that some courts are willing to extend the definition of
"family" member to include these members not within the traditional definition.3 5
28. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 213.5(a), 304,362.4 (amended by Chapter 1138).
29. Id
30. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
31. 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see id. at 2 (defining "family" as "[one or more persons related by blood, adoption
or marriage, or not more than two unrelated persons, living and cooking together as single housekeeping unit").
32. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
33. See Jane Gross, Gays, Singles Also Targets of Adoption Rules, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1996, at A3
(reporting that limited consent adoptions, in which one member of a gay couple adopts the other's child. are
common in big cities like San Francisco and Los Angeles); April Martin, Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriage Puts
Children in Peril, CH. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1996, at 2 (discussing how adoption agencies are increasingly turning to
same-sex couples to provide homes for children).
34. Such "alternative lifestyles" refer not only to same-sex households, but also include homes comprised
of a single parent, relatives other than the biological parents, and other combinations of persons that do not come
within the traditional definition of "family." See Eva Ahlberg, Live-In Lovers in Sweden, Including Gays, Given
Same Rights as Married Couples, L.A. TIE, Mar. 27, 1988, at 15 (reporting that a new Swedish law gives live-in
lovers, whither heterosexual or homosexual, the same rights as couples married by church or state, and that
cohabitation is widely accepted in Sweden); Mae Chun, Traditional Families on the Way Out, NEW STRAITS TIMES
(Malaysia), June 26, 1996, at 12 (commenting that in the era of the 1990s, the definition of"family" encompasses
a "whole slew of diverse images." including single parent families and common-law families); Eric Hanson, Many
More Single with Children, HouSTON CHRON., July 20, 1994, at Al (providing statistics showing that the number
of unmarried-couple households is 3.5 million, as compared to 523,000 in 1970); Betsy White, Education Advisory
Panel Urges Ga. Schools to Broaden Definition of "a Family," ATLANTA J. & CO NST., Oct. 16, 1992, at D2
(reporting that a state advisory panel voted to teach children a more expansive view of families to include un-
married, cohabitating couples and lesbians who have children through artificial insemination).
35. See In re Hirenia C., 18 Cal. App. 4th 504,513. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443,448 (1993) (holding that a "de
facto parent" of a minor has the right to participate as a party in juvenile court proceedings to decide how the care,
custody, and control of the child will be made); see also In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679,692 n.18, 523 P.2d 244.253
n.18, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 453 n.18 (1974) (defining "de facto parent" as one who, on a daily basis, assumes the role
of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical and psychological needs for affection and care).
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Indeed, even within the definition of "de facto parent," there has been a trend toward
extending the definition from one with a blood relation, to a person with no officially
recognized legal status, such as a guardian or foster parent.36 This trend ensures that
persons who might have slipped through the loopholes under the traditional
definition would not be able to do so now when protective orders are concerned.
The final area covered by Chapter 1138 involves status hearings? 7 Before the
amendments, hearings were held once every eighteen months to determine the status
of minors in order to place them in permanent homes.3 Chapter 1138 provides such
hearings once every twelve months.39 This shortened time period between hearings
should help keep juvenile authorities more aware of the child's condition, thus
possibly avoiding certain instances of abuse and death because the authorities were
unaware that such abuse was being committed. Subsequently, the overall well-being
of the child should increase accordingly.
El. TEENAGE DATING VIOLENCE
Today, there is a frighteningly sharp increase in both the number of and the level
of violence in abusive teenage dating relationships.4 This fact is reflected in several
statistics.!1 Up to thirty-three percent of high school students have experienced
physical or sexual violence in their dating relationships.4 2 Between twenty-two
percent and sixty-four percent of dating couples in high school and college have
experienced some form of physical violence in their dating relationships.43
Approximately twenty-eight percent of persons dating will be involved in intimate
violence at some point during their dating lives."
36. See In re Rachael C., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1445, 1452-53, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473,477-78 (1991) (explaining
that in granting de facto status, the court must consider the de facto parents' personal interest in the companionship,
care, custody and management of the child, and not just the closeness of relation to the child).
37. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.25(a), 366.3(0, 11404.1 (amended by Chapter 1138).
38. id. §§ 366.25(a), 366.3(0, 11404.1 (amended by Chapter 1138).
39. Id. §§ 366.25(a), 366.3(0, 11404.1 (amended by Chapter 1138).
40. See Fern Shen, Welts Betray Dark Side of Teen Dating, WASH. POST, July 18, 1993, at Al (discussing
the trend among teenagers engaging in abusive dating relationships that mirrors the battered-spouse syndrome).
41. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
42. ASSEMBLY COMMrTTEE ON JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 2155, at 2 (May 8, 1996).
43. Id.; see Nickie McWhirter, Male Battery of Women Becomes a Growing Trend, DETROIT NEWs, Sept.
26, 1995 (reporting that up to 33% of high school and college age women report experiencing violence in their
dating relationships); Painful Memories Beyond Her Years, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 3, 1995, at SCI (according
to statistics compiled by Sacramento's Women Escaping a Violent Environment, up to 35% of teen dating
relationships included violence).
44. Kathryn E. Suarez, Comment, Teenage Dating Violence: The Need for Expanded Awareness and
Legislation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 423,426 (1994); see Pat Bender, When Teen-Age Romance Turns Violent, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Nov. 23, 1995, at B-13 (citing Barry Levy, a Santa Monica therapist, as saying that at least 25% of
dating teenagers have experienced some form of physical violence); Mark Mueller, State Grant to Schools Targets
Violence in Teen Relationships, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 21, 1995, at 010 (citing one study as finding that 35% of
teens questioned said they were the victims of violence in a dating relationship or knew of someone battered by a
boyfriend or girlfriend).
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This type of violence crosses all socioeconomic boundaries, affecting teens from
every walk of life.45 These teens would normally look to domestic violence statutes
for protection.4 However, most states exclude minors from the ambit of their
domestic violence statutes.4 7 California is one of only ten states that does not exclude
teens from its domestic violence statutes.4 8 Although it does not specifically exclude
teens from its definition, it does not specifically include them, either, causing
occasional confusion as to its intent.49
Until 1996, however, a minor had to have a guardian ad litem5" or other repre-
sentative when appearing in any proceeding, including one for obtaining a protective
order.5t This presented a problem because teens may avoid seeking help as they
might not trust adults with such intimate problems.52 Some teens also may be afraid
that if an adult were to become involved, others would find out about the problem,
including the abuser, who might subsequently do further harm to the victim.
53
45. See Robin Abcarian, Jenny's Story: Parents Were the Last to Know. L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at E14
(discussing the story of a middle-class girl from a semirural, midwestem town who was murdered by her boyfriend);
Marianne Jacobbi, The Silent Epidemic of Teenage Dating Violence, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), May 19, 1996, at IE
(discussing the story of a typical honor roll student from a small town high school who was abused by her
boyfriend).
46. See CAL FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) (setting forth the definition of "domestic violence").
47. Suarez, supra note 44, at 435-38; see id. at 435-38 (citing various states' codes that exclude teens from
coverage by defining domestic violence victims as a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, parent
or adult, among other terms that do not include teens); see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 108.610(3) (1995) (defining a
victim of family violence as a person who has been subjected to "physical injury, sexual abuse or forced imprison-
ment.., by another who is related by blood, marriage or intimate cohabitation"); TEx. HiM. RES. CODE ANN. §
51.002(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1997) (defining a victim of family violence as an "adult who is subjected to physical
force... by another who is related ... to that adult, who is a former spouse of that adult, or who resides in the same
household with that adult").
48. Suarez, supra note 44, at 439; see id. (citing codes from California, Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia, as those which have
structured their domestic violence laws in such a manner as to allow abused teens to take advantage of them); see,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) (including in its definition of "domestic violence," abuse against "a
person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship"); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-6800.3(1), (2) (West Supp. 1997) (same); 750 ILL Comp. STAT. ANN. 60/103(6) (West Supp. 1996)
(same); MAsS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 1(e), 3(a) (West Supp. 1996) (same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:1(I). (IV) (1994) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D) (Michie Supp. 1996) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
07.1-01(2), (4) (Supp. 1995) (same); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (West Supp. 1996) (same); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(2), (3) (West Supp. 1997) (same); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2(b) (1996) (same). Suarez
actually notes 11 states, but Alaska has repealed its statute.
49. See Suarez, supra note 44, at 440 (explaining how the lack of specificity of these cc-des makes the extent
to which teens are included within the coverage of the statutes ambiguous).
50. See BLACK'S LAw DIcrONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "guardian ad litem" as a special guardian
appointed by the court to represent an infant, ward, or unborn person in a particular litigation).
51. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 372 (amended by Chapter 727) (providing that when a minor is a party to
an action or proceeding, the minor shall appear through a guardian or conservator of the estate, or through a
guardian ad litem appointed by the court).
52. ASSEMBLYCOMMrrrEEONJUDICIARY, COMMTrEE ANALYSiS OFAB 2155, at 2 (May 8, 1996).
53. See Shen, supra note 40, at Al (describing how the victim was afraid to tell her parents the truth about
her abusive boyfriend for fear of defying him); see also Jacobbi, supra note 45, at 1E (stating how teenage girls
tolerate the abuse due to fear from their boyfriends' threats of severe harm or even death if the girls tell someone).
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Chapter 727 creates an exception to this law by allowing a minor who is twelve
years of age or older to appear in court without a guardian, counsel, or guardian ad
litem, for the purpose of obtaining a protective order against a person with whom the
minor is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship. Furthermore,
Chapter 727 requires a copy of the order to be sent, at the court's discretion, to at
least one parent or guardian under certain circumstances, unless it would be contrary
to the best interest of the minor.55
Chapter 727 appears to provide a proper balance among all the parties having an
interest in the matter. The minor has the opportunity to appear and voice concerns
without adult interference, while the court still retains the right to appoint a guardian
if it feels necessary. In addition, parents and guardians may still be notified under
certain circumstances.
This approach seems to make more sense, as juveniles between the ages of
twelve and seventeen tend to be underestimated in their ability to make mature
decisions.57 In looking at the history of statutes regarding the appointment of
guardians ad litem, it is readily ascertainable that such statutes were enacted to
protect minor, mentally disabled,58 and incompetente9 persons To categorize minors
with mentally disabled and incompetent persons seems to insult the intelligence of
many of them. Indeed, it appears that this notion was more prevalent in times past,
as seen in older cases such as Robelet v. Robelet.61 In that case, the court held, in a
custody proceeding, that when children are under the age of fourteen, it is not an
abuse of discretion to determine which parent is awarded custody of the children
without allowing the children to express an opinion as to their preference.62
54. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b) (1) (amended by Chapter 727).
55. Id. § 372.2(bX2) (enacted by Chapter 727); see id. (describing such circumstances as those in which the
minor initially appeared in court seeking a protective order without a guardian ad litem or if the minor is residing
with a parent or guardian).
56. See id. (providing that unless contrary to the best interest of the minor, a copy of the order shall be sent
to at least one parent if the minor initially appeared in court seeking a protective order without a guardian and the
minor is residing with a parent or guardian).
57. But see Assent, Dissent on Parental Consent Law, LA. Tmrs, Apr. 28, 1996, at E5 (quoting a reader's
opinion that a minor is unable to make informed and mature decisions with respect to abortions); 'Shotgun
Weddings' Way offTarget, CHt. Tm., Sept. 5, 1996, at 16 (stating that in statutory rape cases, consent of the minor
is not an issue because it is understood that the minor lacks judgment mature enough to make such a decision).
58. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7827 (West Supp. 1997) (defining a "mentally disabled" parent as one who
suffers mental incapacity or disorder that renders him or her unable to care for the child adequately).
59. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 3603 (West 1991) (defining an "incompetent person" as one for whom a
conservator may be appointed).
60. Briggs v. Briggs, 160 Cal. App. 2d 312, 319, 325 P.2d 219, 223 (1958); see id. (holding that statutes
regarding appointment of guardians ad litem were enacted to protect minors, insane and incompetent persons, and
not to preclude them from their legal rights).
61. 130 Cal. App. 2d 244,278 P.2d 753 (1955).
62. Robelet, 130 Cal. App. 2d at 248,278 P.2d at 755.
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However, it appears that today, minors have more of a say in such proceedings.
63
This trend is exemplified in the case of In re Marriage of Rosson.6 The court held
that the two children, ages ten and thirteen, should be given the opportunity to
express their preference in a custody proceeding.65 Moreover, the court added that
"maturity is not measured by chronological age."6 This line of thinking is perhaps
an actual trend in the way courts view the ability of minors to make intelligent
decisions. If so, it parallels the changes in our society which have increasingly come
to recognize the abilities of minors, as well as place greater responsibilities onto their
shoulders.
IV. CHILD ABUSE
Unfortunately, along with teenage dating violence, there is an increase in the
number of child abuse cases reported today.67 Studies show that there is a correlation
between spousal abuse and child abuse.68 Statistics reveal that there is a forty-five to
seventy-five percent correlation between the two.69 Eighty-five percent of batterers
either witnessed or experienced physical abuse as a child. 0
Existing California law provides that in making a determination of the best
interest of the child in a custody proceeding, the court shall consider specific factors,
including any history of abuse by one parent against the child or against the other
parent.'
63. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
64. 178 Cal. App. 3d 1094,224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1986).
65. In re Marriage of Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1103,224 Cal. Rptr. at 256-57.
66. Id. at 1103,224 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
67. SeeHenry Goldman, MY. Mother Charged with Murderin Girl's Death byStarvation, ORANGECO tNTY
REG., Sept. 5, 1996, at A16 (stating that New York City has experienced a 40% increase in child abuse reports this
year); Sabbaye McGriff, Shelter to Reopen, with More Help for Children in Need, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 1,
1996, at 3C (reporting that the number of reported child abuse cases in Georgia over the past decade has increased
over 200%); Kimberly Schaye, Calls to Abuse Hotline Increase 40% This Year, DAILY NEws (N.Y.), Sept. 4, 1996,
at 6 (reporting a 40% increase in calls to the state Central Register for Child Abuse and Maltreatment during the
first half of this year); Misti Snow, Killing of Children 'Fits with Trend,' STAR TRIB. (Minn.), July 16, 1996, at IA
(quoting Roy Garza, director of the Minnesota Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse, as saying that recent
killings of children at the hands of adults "fit with the trend of increasing child abuse").
68. See Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children: Understanding the
Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1111-14 (1995) (describing the well-documented pattern of children who
witness domestic violence growing up to become abusers themselves).
69. ASSEMBLY COMMTrEE ON JuDICIARY, COIMrTrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2474, at 2 (May 8, 1996).
70. Id.; see Dee Aker, The World Is Watching; New Approach to Domestic Abuse Saves Women's Lives,
CHI. TRio., Aug. 11, 1996, at I (stating that children from domestic violence environments are 1000 times more
likely to b-- abusive when they become adults).
71. See CAL. FMi. CODE § 3011 (amended by Chapter 835) (listing the other factors as the health, safety,
and welfare of the child, and the nature and amount of contact with both parents).
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Chapter 835 extends the scope of the persons covered under the present statute
to include more victims of abuse.72 This way, persons other than those falling under
the traditional definition of family/household member will be considered when it
comes to abuse. This is important because many households today consist of persons
other than biological parents or guardians? 3 Those persons should not be excluded
from these statutes protecting children from abuse, either directly or indirectly (as a
witness). Expanding this definition will provide greater protection for children
belonging to such households.
V. CONCLUSION
These bills seek to expand the breadth of the traditional definition of family.
Today, there are families comprised of various people other than the biological or
adopted parents. 4 This should be seen as a very positive step forward. With these
changes, however, comes the increased chance that abuse will come from these
"other" family members. Our laws in California should reflect these changes
accordingly. Passing Chapters 1138, 727, and 835 covers the typical circle of
violence-abused children are much more likely to become abusers in the future with
their own children. Enacting these laws provides a greater measure of protection for
children from various forms of abuse.
APPENDIX
Code Sections Affected
Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 213.5, 304, 362.4, 366.25, 366.3, 11404.1
(amended).
AB 2154 (Kuehl); 1996 STAT. Ch. 1138
Code of Civil Procedure § 372 (amended); Family Code § 6301 (amended).
AB 2155 (Kuehl); 1996 STAT. Ch. 727
Family Code § 3011 (amended).
AB 2474 (Kuehl); 1996 STAT. Ch. 835
72. See iaL § 3011(b) (amended by Chapter 835) (stating that the court shall, among other factors, consider
any history of abuse by one parent (or any other person seeking custody), against: (1) Any child to whom there is
a relation by blood or with whom one has had a caretaking relationship, no matter how temporary; (2) the other
parent; or (3) a parent, current spouse, or cohabitant of the person seeking custody, or a person with whom the
person seeking custody has a dating or engagement relationship).
73. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
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The Parents' Right to Obtain Drug and Alcohol Abuse
Treatment for Minor Children
Julie Momfian
I. INTRODUCTION
Society has traditionally viewed minors' as immature and incapable of making
decisions affecting their own well-being, and the laws of our society reflect that
belief.2 An example of an area of the law where minors have limited rights and which
has engendered much debate in recent years involves the medical treatment of
minors. When courts deal with the medical treatment of a minor, consent by a parent
or guardian is necessary to authorize the treatment, or the resulting treatment will be
considered a battery3 for which the physician will be liable.4
California, however, in 1992, enacted § 6929 of the Family Code, which ex-
panded the rights afforded to minors by granting a minor who is twelve years or
older the ability to submit to drug or alcohol abuse treatment absent parental con-
sent.5 Accordingly, by recognizing the right of a minor to legally consent to treat-
1. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6500 (West 1994) (defining a "minor" as a person under 18 years of age).
2. See, e.g., id. § 6701 (West 1994) (stating that a minor does not have the authority to make a contract
relating to real property or personal property not in the immediate possession of the minor); id. § 6710 (West 1994)
(declaring that a contract by a minor may be disaffirmed by the minor before majority or within a reasonable time
afterwards); see also Burnand v. Irigoyen, 30 Cal. 2d 861,866, 186 P.2d 417, 420 (1947) (declaring that the general
theory behind a minor's ability to disaffirm a contract is to protect infants, not only from others, but also from
themselves); Pollock v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 5 Cal. 2d 205, 210-11, 54 P.2d 695, 698 (1936) (declaring
that because minors have the right to take away their consent, persons normally contracting with a minor do so at
their own peril). But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922 (West 1994) (stating that those contracts that minors enter into
which are necessary for their support or the support of their family may not be disaffirmed by the minor).
3. See CAL PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1995) (defining a "battery" as an unlawful use of force or violence
on another).
4. See Bonner v. Maron, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that performing surgery on a 15-
year-old boy with only the consent of the minor, absent special circumstances, constitutes a battery regardless of
the outcome of the surgery); see also Rowint H. Brown & Richard B. Truitt, The Right of Minors to Medical
Treatment, 28 DEPAuL L. REv. 289, 290 (1979) (stating that parental consent is necessary for medical treatment
of minors). But see G. Emmett Raitt, Jr., The Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Treatment, 48 S. CAL. L. REv.
1417, 1418-19 (1975) (stating that minors may consent to medical treatment without the consent of their parents
if they are "emancipated" minors).
5. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10 at 543 (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929); see CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6921 (West Supp. 1996) (proclaiming that if a minor consents to drug or alcohol abuse treatment, such consent
is not subject to disaffrmnance); cf ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1990) (declaring that a minor may give effective consent
to determine the presence of drug dependency); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-26(e) (Michie 1993) (stating that the
consent given to drug or alcohol abuse counseling by a minor who suffers or professes to suffer from drug or
alcohol abuse shall be valid and binding as if the minor had reached majority); 410 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 210/4
(West 1993) (acknowledging that a minor 12 years or older who may be determined to be an addict or an alcoholic
or intoxicated p.-rson, and may give consent to the furnishing of medical case related to the diagnosis); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 144.343(1) (West 1989) (stating that any minor may give effective consent for medical, mental, and other
health services to determine the presence of or to treat alcohol and other drug abuse).
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ment, § 6929 also impliedly relieves a treating physician from incurring liability for
the resulting treatment without subjecting a physician to legal liability. Existing law
further provides that a minor's representative has a right to inspect the medical
records of the minor, but creates an exception for such records concerning treatment
for which legal consent by the minor alone may be given.6
Chapter 656 provides that a parent or guardian of a minor may consent to alcohol
or drug abuse treatment of a minor even if the minor is over twelve years of age and
has manifested an objection to the treatment.7 Chapter 656 also provides that parents
who seek drug or alcohol abuse treatment for their minor children have a right to the
disclosure of their child's medical records upon their request!
II. PARENTS' CONSENT TRADITIONALLY
Raising a child in these modem times causes many parents fear. One such fear
is that their child will somehow get involved in drugs and alcohol. The drug and
alcohol abuse rate among teens in the United States has escalated to an astonishing
figure.9 A national survey conducted in 1992 by the National Center for Health
Statistics stated that forty percent of all youths in America have consumed alcohol
ten or more times in their lives.' ° The same study reported that three out of ten
youngsters had at one time experimented with illegal substances."
With this high rate of alcohol and drug abuse comes concerned parents. Sup-
porters of Chapter 656 declare that parents who are concerned about their child's
welfare need a legal mechanism entitling them to place their child in drug or alcohol
abuse programs even over the protests of the affected child.' 2 However, these same
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123115 (West 1995); see id. (stating that a parent is not entitled to
inspect medical records when a doctor believes that allowing the inspection would be detrimental to the care of the
minor); 42 C.F.R. § 2.14(b) (1995) (stating that where a minor patient can alone lawfully give consent to alcohol
and drug abuse treatment under state law, consent for disclosure of medical records may be given only by the minor
patient); id. § 2.14(c) (1995) (stating that where state law requires consent of parent for alcohol or drug abuse
treatment, both the minor and the parent must give consent for disclosure of medical records); see also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123110 (West 1995) (stating that a minor has a right to inspect his medical records only
for the health care with respect to which he has a lawful right to consent).
7. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(0 (amended by Chapter 656).
8. Id. § 6929(g) (amended by Chapter 656).
9. See States Take Action, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1986, at 8 (surveying the situation of drug use in American
schools); see also Christine Russell, Do You Know What Your Kids Are Doing?, WASH. POST, July 11, 1995, at Z10
(stating that teens are engaging in risky behavior that could lead to chronic disease, injury, and death, according
to a national household survey of 10,645 youths from 12 to 21 years of age).
10. See Russell, supra note 9, at ZIO (verifying that the alcohol rate is inclusive of eight percent of 12- to
13-year-olds and one-third of 14- to 17-year-olds).
11. Id.
12. ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMI'rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2883, at 2 (May 8, 1996); see
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 12 Cal. 4th 1007, 1029, 912 P.2d 1148, 1161, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210.
214 (1996) (stating that under our statutes there is a presumption that an unemancipated minor, unlike an eman-
cipated minor or adult women, is incapable of informed consent); see id. (stating that even under California Family
Code § 6929(c), treatment requires the minor's parents' involvement, unless, in the opinion of the professional
19971Juveniles
proponents feel that parents should be given this right without jeopardizing the right
that children have been granted under California Family Code § 6929, enabling
children to seek treatment on their own accord. t3 Moreover, by allowing parents
access to medical records of minor children, proponents assert that Chapter 656 will
allow parents to make informed decisions about their childern's care. 4
The apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the original legislation, Califor-
nia Family Code § 6929, was to provide minors above the age of twelve with the
ability to obtain drug and alcohol abuse treatment when their parents were unable or
unwilling to provide consent for them. 5 Accordingly, supporters argue that nothing
in the original legislation reflects an intent to limit the ability of parents to consent
to treatment on behalf of their children, if they feel that their child has a problem with
drugs or alcohol, even if that consent is given over the objection of the minor child.'6
The fact that the courts of the United States have consistently deferred to the
decisions that parents make with respect to the well-being of their children lends
Chapter 656 further justification.' 7 Courts continually emphasize the liberty interest
parents possess in raising their children and the power they hold in making decisions
concerning the health and well-being of their children.'3 Normally a court will not
interfere with parental custody and control of minor children unless the parents are
proven to be unfit,19 which usually requires a showing that the parents' continued
treating, it would be inappropriate).
13. ASSEMBLYCOMMm EEON JUDICIARY, COMMITEE ANALYSTS OF AB 2883, at 2 (May 8, 1996).
14. Id.
15. Id. See generally American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, Confidential Health
Services for Adolescents, 269 JAMA 1420, 1421 (1993) (reporting that 49% of adolescents would seek medical
treatment for drug use if they were assured it would be confidential as opposed to 17% if no assurance of
confidentiality was given).
16. ASSEMBLYCOMMITrEEONJUDICIARY, CoMMITrEEANALYsIS OFAB 2883, at 2 (May 8, 1996).
17. See Santoskcy v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982) (stating that parents have a liberty interest in the care,
custody, and management of their child); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (holding that the respective
rights and prerogatives of the child and parent in the voluntary commitment setting permit the parents "to retain
a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse, and that the traditional
presumption that the parents act in the best interests of the child should apply"); In re John S., 66 Cal. App. 3d 343.
346, 135 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898 (1977) (declaring that parental rights include the ability, and also the duty, to prescribe
medical treatment for a child that is in the child's best interest); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (holding that an unwed father is entitled to a hearing on his fitness before his child is taken away because
of the interest parents have in the care, custody, and management of their child); Loren Mark, The Competent
Child's Preferences in Critical Medical Decisions, II W. ST. L. REV. 25, 28 (1983) (asserting that in family
litigation, great deference is granted to parents in the assessment of the decisions a court should make as to the
child's future). But see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding that a statutory provision
that grants a parent absolute power to overrule a determination made by a physician and his minor patient to
terminate a pregnancy is unconstitutional).
18. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
19. See id. at 760 (holding that until the state proves parental unfitness, the child and the parent share a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship); Mark, supra note 17, at 29 (stating that
absent a showing of parental unfitness or detriment that would result from allowing parents to retain custody, the
state cannot disrupt the parent-child relationship).
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custody and control would be contrary to the child's best interests' Courts are
reluctant to sever the tie that binds parent and child in recognition of the strong belief
that family is a critical part of society.2 Accordingly, in order to preserve the sanctity
of the family, courts give parents a great amount of deference in raising their
children.22 However, this does not mean that parents have absolute control over their
children. A court will interfere if it is in the child's best interest.3
E. A MINOR'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
While the purpose behind Chapter 656 seems commendable, its basis may be
constitutionally unsound. Although minors may not have rights as extensive as adults
under the United States Constitution,24 they are still considered "persons," and are
afforded protection.25 Accordingly, because this legislation states that minors could
be placed in treatment over their objection, Chapter 656 may work to deprive minors
of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.O
The United States Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R.,27 set the minimum pro-
cedural requirements that should be afforded minors before minors can be institu-
tionalized against their will.2 In Parham, a minor boy was placed in a Georgia state
mental hospital involuntarily, upon the request of his parents, pursuant to a Georgia
statute.29 The Court recognized that a child has a liberty interest in not being confined
unnecessarily for treatment and analyzed the statute and procedure of admittance into
the hospital in order to determine whether the minor's rights had been violated.3° To
20. Mark, supra note 17, at 29.
21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22. Id.
23. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see id. (declaring that the rights of parents are not
beyond limitation when the minor's well-being is at stake).
24. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 12 Cal. 4th 1007, 1024, 912 P.2d 1148, 1156-57, 51
Cal. Rptr. 2d 201,210 (1996) (explaining that an unemancipated minor's rights are in some instances more limited
then the rights held by an adult); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921,928, 569 P.2d 1286, 1290, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 302
(1977) (asserting that the liberty interest of a minor is not coextensive with that of an adult).
25. See Planned Parenthood v. Danford, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (declaring that minors, as well as adults,
possess constitutional rights); In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 401, 595 P.2d 105, 108, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674
(1979) (stating that minors are also "persons" under the Constitution, thus their rights must be recognized); Raitt,
supra note 4, at 1432 (stating that minors are persons under the Federal Constitution).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (guaranteeing that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law").
27. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
28. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
29. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
30. Id. at 600; see In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d at 927,569 P.2d at 1289, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (holding that
a minor should have been granted a precommitment hearing in front of a neutral fact finder before he was confined
in a mental institution); In re John S., 66 Cal. App. 3d 348, 358, 135 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901 (1977) (stating that a
decision by parents to treat their minor's mental disorder in a private institution does not work as a denial of the
minor's due process rights).
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make this determination, the court applied a balancing test. 1 Among the factors
considered by the Court were the private interest that would be affected by the action,
the risk of mistakenly depriving the minor of such an interest because of the pro-
cedures used by the state, and the state's interest in following the stated procedure.
32
Applying the factors, the Court held that a person has a liberty interest in not
being confined unnecessarily, and further found that there is a high risk of error when
parents are allowed to make the decision for treatment. 33 Moreover, the Court
required that the state establish some sort of inquiry to be undertaken prior to
confinement so as to decrease the chance of erroneously depriving a child of a liberty
interest.3 This inquiry, the Court explained, must, at the least, explore the child's
background using parents, schools, and other social agencies as keys in this investi-
gation.35 An interview with the child is also necessary to determine whether the child
satisfies the medical standards for admission.36 Finally, the Court stated that the
child's continuing need for commitment must be reviewed periodically to determine
whether the child is in further need of treatment. 37 The Court held that Georgia's state
procedures met these minimum requirements, and thus did not deprive the minor of
the constitutional right to due process?8
Although Chapter 656 is not aimed at institutionalization in a state mental
hospital, it gives parents the opportunity to place their children in drug and alcohol
abuse treatment programs which, in some cases, could involve involuntary confine-
ment of the minor. Thus, because Chapter 656 has the potential of confining minors
against their will, it involves a liberty interest analogous to the one in Parham, which
the Supreme Court found to be deserving of constitutional protection.39 Similar to the
situation in Parham, the risk of error in affording a parent an absolute right to place
a child in drug or alcohol abuse treatment is high. This is due to the fact that parents
tend to overreact when confronted with the behavior of difficult teens, and thus might
31. Parham, 442U.S. at584-85.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 606; see id. at 604-05 (declaring that the state also has an interest in reserving its state facilities
for cases of genuine need).
34. Id. at606.
35. Id. at 606-07.
36. Id. at 607.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 616-17; see id. at 591 (remarking that the Georgia state statute involved a procedure which
required a superintendent of a facility to observe a minor and then, only after finding evidence of mental illness,
admit the minor for treatment); id. (stating that the Georgia statute enabled a superintendent of the facility to
discharge those who had recovered from the illness or who had sufficiently improved); see also id. at 604
(clarifying the difference between the statute struck down in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, which provided for
an absolute parental veto over the child's decision to obtain an abortion, and the Georgia statute, which in no way
involved an absolute right to commit children to state hospitals, but only required the superintendent of each
hospital to decide independently whether the child was in need of confinement).
39. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the Parham decision).
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mistakenly attribute their behavior to drug or alcohol dependency. 4 The state, how-
ever, does have an interest in ensuring the well-being of minors who are unable to
recognize that they need help and in providing parents with the authority to obtain
that help.
Thus, with respect to confinement in a drug or alcohol treatment program,
Chapter 656 mirrors the situation presented in Parham. However, unlike the statute
involved in Parham, which mandated that the child first be determined to be in need
of treatment before being confined against his or her will,4" Chapter 656 does not set
forth any procedural requirements to determine whether a minor is actually in need
of drug or alcohol abuse treatment prior to placing the minor in a program.42 How-
ever, drug or alcohol abuse programs will afford minors the procedure to which they
are entitled perhaps by administering a drug or alcohol abuse test prior to admittance
in the program. Nonetheless, because Chapter 656 does not require a finding that a
minor who is admitted by the minor's parents is genuinely in need of confinement,
Chapter 656 could potentially come under constitutional attack if at any time a
treatment facility does not take the necessary steps to ensure the protection of the
minor's liberty interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the intent behind the enactment of Chapter 656 is commendable, it
leaves itself open to potential due process problems. By simply stating that parents
may place their child into drug and alcohol abuse treatment against the minor's will,
without specifying some type of procedure to be used to determine whether the child
really needs the treatment, Chapter 656 could be used as a tool in the violation of a
minor's right to constitutional due process.
APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Family Code § 6929 (amended).
AB 2883 (Boland); 1996 STAT. Ch. 656
40. In re John S., 66 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02; see id. (recognizing that parents do not
always view the problems of their child objectively, and consequently, may commit a child in a mental institution
as a sanction for misbehavior, because the parents have financial problems with the child, or simply because they
are unwilling to assume the responsibilities of parenthood).
41. Parham, 442 U.S. at 591.
42. CAL FAM. CODE § 6929(0, (g) (amended by Chapter 656).

